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And, certainly, there can be no pretence to say, that any foreign
nation has a right to require the full recognition and execution
of its own laws in other territories, when those laws are deemed
oppressive or injurious to the rights or interests of the inhabitants
ot the latter, or when their moral character is questionable or their
provisions are impolitic or unjust.20
The decision reached by the majority, extending the Act of State doc-
trine to foreign acts which violate international law, is another step towards
defining the role of domestic courts in the areas of foreign relations and
international law.
T. F. LYSAUGHT
WITNESSES-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-INSURED'S STATEMENT TO IN-
SURER REMAINS PRIVILEGED ALTHOUGH TRANSMITTED TO ATTORNEY DEFEND-
ING INSURED ON CRIMINAL CHARGE-In People v. Ryan, 30 Ill. 2d 456, 197
N.E.2d 15 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with the ques-
tions of (1) whether an insured's written statement given to her liability
insurance carrier's investigator regarding the details of an accident she was
involved in was within the attorney-client privilege, and (2) whether the
transmittal of such statement, with her consent, to the attorney defending
her on a criminal charge arising out of the same accident was a voluntary
waiver of the privilege, thereby subjecting the statement to discovery by
the prosecutor. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Ap-
pellate Court' for the Third District and held that the insured's statement
given to her insurer was within the attorney-client privilege and not subject
to discovery by the State, while in control of the insurer, or even after trans-
mittal, with the insured's consent, to her attorney for use in defending her
in a criminal proceeding.
On February 18, 1961, Della Emberton was involved in an automobile-
truck collision resulting in the death of two persons. At the time of the
accident, Mrs. Emberton carried a public liability insurance policy, whereby
her insurance carrier agreed to defend and pay all claims for personal
acts of state which do not conflict with the fundamental concepts of justice and morality
prevailing in the international community." Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am.
J..Int'l L. 826,-852 (1959).
20 Story, Conflict of Laws § 33 (3d ed. 1846).
I The Appellate Court said that the insured's statement would be privileged while in
the insurance carrier's hands or if transmitted to the attorney of its choice in defending
the insured. However, the court held that the privilege was waived when transmitted to
Ryan for use in defending Della Emberton against the criminal charge, a use entirely
different from that which the statement was originally intended. Ryan was considered to
be a mere third party to whom a privileged communication was revealed with consent of
the person entitled to assert the privilege (the insured), thereby waiving the privilege.
People v. Ryan, 40 Ill. App. 2d 352, 189 N.E.2d 763 (3d Dist. 1963).
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injury, wrongful death and property damage resulting from operation of
her automobile. The policy required her to cooperate with the insurance
company in their defense of any suits brought against her. On February 20,
1961, Della Emberton gave the insurance company's investigator a signed
statement covering the details surrounding the accident in which she ad-
mitted that she had consumed several bottles of beer prior to the time of the
accident. In February, 1961, an information was filed in the County Court
of Douglas County, charging Mrs. Emberton with driving the automobile
involved in the accident while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On
February 24, 1961, Willis P. Ryan, an attorney, was employed by Mrs.
Emberton to defend her on the criminal charge. On June 21, 1961, Mr.
Ryan, being acquainted with Mrs. Emberton's insurance company as a
result of previous employment, requested and obtained the use of its in-
vestigation file (including Della Emberton's written statement) for use in
the trial of the criminal case. On July 5, 1961, the State's Attorney sub.
poenaed Della Emberton's written statement and when Ryan refused to
produce it, while acting upon his client's directions, he was adjudged in
contempt of court and fined $100. Ryan appealed his conviction directly
to the Illinois Supreme Court2 on an alleged constitutional ground but the
case was transferred to the Appellate Court for the Third District. The
Appellate Court affirmed the trial court and the Illinois Supreme Court
granted leave to appeal.
Ryan was not engaged in defending any civil litigation for the insur-
ance company arising out of the accident, either at the time he obtained the
investigation file or at the time the statement was subpoenaed.
The protective cloak of the attorney-client privilege is granted to confi-
dential communications in order to secure to the client freedom of mind in
seeking legal advice. It is thought to be impossible for a layman to prosecute
or defend his legitimate claims without securing the professional advice of
an attorney. Of course, the attorney must be told all of the pertinent facts
surrounding his client's legal problem in order to act in his best interests.
Presumably, the client would be reluctant to divulge facts which he con-
sidered unfavorable to his cause if he thought that either he or hisattorney
could be forced to testify to such facts in any subsequent litigation. The
attorney-client privilege is designed only to provide adequate protection to
the client so that he will be unrestrained in seeking legal advice from an
attorney, and it does not attempt to secure freedom of mind to third
2 The only constitutional ground upon which Ryan relied pertained to a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination. The court held that the privilege against self-
incrimination was a purely personal one available only to the client and not to the
attorney. Since there was no other constitutional ground upon which the Illinois Supreme
Court could take jurisdiction on a direct appeal, it transferred the case to the Appellate
Court for a determination of the asserted attorney-client, privilege. People v. Ryan, 25
Ill. 2d 233, 184 N.E.2d 853 (1962).
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persons, nor is it designed to afford secrecy to the attorney's preparation of
his client's case.
A trial is a search for truth and courts will generally admit all evidence
which is competent, relevant, and material to the issue at hand. Since the
exclusion of a witness' testimony has a tendency to prevent full disclosure
of the truth, the scope of privileged communications is generally strictly
confined.3 Wigmore has stated that the following four conditions are funda-
mental to the establishment of any privileged communication:
(1) The communications must originate in confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the commu-
nity ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.4
In applying the above conditions, the court is necessarily always balancing
the benefits to be derived from a full disclosure of all the pertinent facts
against the benefits of a privileged communication.
The following general principles are necessary to give rise to the at-
torney-client privilege:
(l) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
egal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications re-
lating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived.5
The privileged status of a communication between attorney and client is
personal to the client, not the attorney, and may be asserted or waived by
the client only.6 The communication must be intended by the client to be
confidential to be privileged from disclosure and the presence of a third
person will ordinarily indicate a lack of intention that the communication
be confidential.7 However, since the attorney must of necessity use agents
and clerks in conducting his business, a disclosure to the attorney's agent
will not defeat the privilege,8 nor will the privilege be defeated if the client
uses his agent in communicating with the attorney, if there is a good reason
for using an intermediary.9 A client may waive the privilege by voluntarily
8 Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89 (1831).
4 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (3d ed. 1961).
5 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (3d ed. 1961).
6 People v. Marcofsky, 219 111. App. 230 (1st Dist. 1920).
7 Champion v. McCarthy, 228 Il. 87, 81 N.E. 808 (1907).
8 In Re Estate of Busse, 332 Ill. App. 258, 75 N.E.2d 36 (2d Dist. 1947).
9 Webb v. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P.2d 532 (1931).
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testifying to confidential communications with his attorney.10 If knowledge
is obtained from a source other than the client, it is not ordinarily privi-
leged."'
In People v. Ryan, Ryan contended that his client's written statement
retained its privileged character when transmitted to the attorney represent-
ing the person entitled to assert the privilege. The People, although agree-
ing with the result reached by the Appellate Court, nevertheless argued that
the decision should have been arrived at by holding that communications
between an insurer and an insured are not privileged. Although the ques-
tion of whether communications between an insured and an insurer are
privileged had never been decided in Illinois, the weight of authority in
other jurisdictions, with the exception of some Federal courts,12 is that they
are privileged.18 A California court has held that a
- . . report or other communication made by an insured to his
liability insurance company concerning an event which may be
made the basis of a claim against him covered by the policy is
privileged, as being between attorney-client, if the policy requires
the company to defend him through its attorney, and the commu-
nication is intended for the information or assistance of the attor-
ney in so defending him. 14
If the communication to an attorney serves a dual purpose, one of which is
within the attorney-client privilege and the other without, then the court
must determine which predominates. 15 This is the line of reasoning which
the Illinois Supreme Court used in holding that Della Emberton's statement
to her insurer was within the attorney-client privilege. The court said that:
. . . the insured effectively delegates to the insurer the selection
of an attorney and the conduct of the defense of any civil litiga-
tion and . . . may properly assume that the communication is
10 People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, 107 N.E. 165 (1914).
11 Chillicothe Ferry, Road & Bridge Co. v. Jameson, 48 Ill. 281 (1868); Radio Corp.
of America v. Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (1956).
12 Colpak v. Hetterick, 40 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Gordon v. Robinson, 109 F.
Supp. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1952). The scope of examination for deposition or discovery in Fed-
eral District courts allows the witness to "be examined regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b). Illinois' statutory provision regarding discovery and deposition apparently
recognizes the usual privileges as well as the attorney's "work product" privilege first
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385 (1947). The Illinois statute
states: "All matters which are privileged against discovery upon the trial are privileged
against disclosure through any discovery procedure. Disclosure of memoranda, reports, or
documents made by or for a party in preparation for trial or any privileged communica-
tions between any party or his agent and the attorney for the party shall not be required
through any discovery procedure." Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, 101.19-5 (1) (1963).
13 Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567, 74
A.L.R.2d 526 (1959); Hollien v. Kaye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In re
Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492, 108 A.L.R. 505 (1936); Westminister Airways,
Ltd. v. Kuwait Oil Co., [1951) 1 K.B. 134, 22 A.L.R.2d 648.
14 Heifron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal. App, 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567, 573, 74
A.L.R.2d 526, 534 (1959).
15 Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954).
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made to the insurer as agent for the dominant purpose of trans-
mitting it to an attorney for the protection of the interests of the
insured.' 6
The Illinois Supreme Court stated "... that the same salutory reasons for
the privilege exist whether.., the communication is directly between client
and attorney ... or to an insurance investigator."17
Having decided that a communication between an insured and an in-
surer was privileged, the Illinois Supreme Court next turned to the question
of whether the transmitting of Della Emberton's statement, with her con-
sent, from the insurer to Ryan was a waiver of the privilege, as being a
disclosure to a third party. It is well settled that since the privilege against
disclosure belongs to the insured, the insured may be shown to have waived
it by disclosure to others.'8 In the present case, the court speaking through
Justice Solfisburg said:
.... We think it dear that if Della Emberton personally repeated
the identical communication to an attorney retained to defend her
either in a civil or criminal proceeding, the second identical state-
ment would also be privileged. If the required relationship be-
tween the parties existed in the first instance, it also existed in the
second.
We see no logical reason for a different result when a trans-
cription of the first confidential communication is transmitted with
the consent of the insured to the second attorney. In the absence
of disclosure to a person not in an attorney-client relationship
with the insured there is no waiver of the privilege.'9 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court has followed an early New York case
which held there was no "solid distinction between the oral statement of a
fact and a communication of the same fact by delivering a deed or other
written instrument"20 to an attorney, so long as it is intended to be confi-
dential.
The extension of the attorney-client privilege to statements transmitted
to the client's attorney for use in another cause is not only logical, but in no
way transgresses the four fundamental conditions laid down by Wigmore2l
as necessary to the establishment of any privileged communication. Al-
though the insured contracts with an insurance company to defend her in
any civil action brought against her and agrees in turn to cooperate with the
insurance company in defending such claims (including the giving of her
statement regarding the details of any accident), surely she cannot be said
to have waived her right to use her same statement in another civil or
10 People v. Ryan, 30 I11. 2d 456, 460, 197 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1964).
17 Ibid.
18 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cochrane, 155 Ohio St. 305, 95 N.E.2d 840 (1951).
'9 30 Ill. 2d 456, 461, 197 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1964).
20 Coveny v. Tonnahill, 1 Hill 33, 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
21 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (3d ed. 1961).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
criminal proceeding. It would be meaningless to require her written state-
ment to remain in the insurance company files in order to retain its privi-
leged status, whereas her oral statement to her attorney in another cause,
disclosing the same information, would be privileged. The rule, that there
is no waiver of the privilege so long as there is not a disclosure to a person
not within the attorney-client relationship, adequately protects the client's
freedom of mind in securing legal advice without unnecessarily restricting
the courts' search for truth.
THOMAS C. RYDELL
DEATH BY WRONGFUL AC--AMENDMENT SUPPLYING NECESSARY ALLEGA-
TION NAMING DECEDENT'S NEXT OF KIN AND THEIR PECUNIARY Loss NOT
BARRED BY EXPIRATION OF LIMITATION PERIOD PROVIDED BY THE WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE.-In Waller v. Cooper, 49 Ill. App. 2d 482, 200 N.E.2d 105
(1st Dist. 1964), the Illinois Appellate Court was confronted with the prob-
lem of whether an amendment to a complaint, supplying an allegation
naming decedent's next of kin and their pecuniary loss, was barred by the
two year period fixed by the Wrongful Death Act. The court held that an
amendment of this type related back to the filing of the original complaint.
The decedent in the present case died on January 30, 1960. The plain-
tiff, as administratrix, filed a Statement of Claim on January 27, 1962,
against defendant Cooper for wrongfully causing the death of plaintiff's
intestate. This claim failed to allege the decedent's "next of kin" and their
"pecuniary loss" as required by Section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act.' The
plaintiff subsequently filed an amendment to her claim supplying these
necessary allegations. However, this amendment was not filed until after
the two year period for filing claims under the Wrongful Death Act had
expired.2
The Municipal Court of Chicago dismissed the plaintiffs' action on
the ground that the original claim failed to comply with the requirements
of the Wrongful Death Act, because it failed to name the decedent's "next
of kin" and their "pecuniary loss," and the amended claim which supplied
these missing allegations was barred by the two year period prescribed by
the Act. On Appeal, held: Reversed for plaintiff. The appellate court rea-
soned that an amendment to a claim under the Wrongful Death Act, sup-
plying necessary allegations of decedent's next of kin and their pecuniary
loss, filed more than two years after decedent's death, related back to the
filing of the original claim. Under the original claim, the plaintiff sought
1 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, § 2 (1963) "Every such action shall be brought ... in the
names of the personal representative . . . shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow
and next of kin . . . jury may give damages ... with reference to pecuniary injuries . . ."
2 I1. Rev. Stat. Ch. 70, § 2 (1963) ".. . Provided, that every such action shall be
commenced within two years after the death of such person . . ."
